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MISUSING TEXTUALISM:  
A FURTHER REPLY TO PROF. KAHN 
Prof. Stephen B. Cohen, Georgetown Law, 202-352-8244, 
sbclawprof@aol.com 
 
Because readers have already endured four separate articles, 
two by Prof. Douglas A. Kahn and two by me, debating the 
interpretation of Internal Revenue Code Section 67(e)(1), I am 
reluctant to respond to Prof. Kahn’s rejoinder, which appeared in the 
Tax Notes issue of January 18.1  Nevertheless, our disagreement 
implicates the judicial craft of two current U.S. Supreme Court 
members, Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor.  I therefore feel it important to answer Prof. Kahn’s latest 
contentions, recognizing my duty to be as brief as possible. 
                                      
1 Stephen B. Cohen, ‘‘Judge Sotomayor’s Tax Opinions,’’ Tax Notes, 
Aug. 3, 2009, p. 474, Doc 2009-15953, or 2009 TNT 146-12; Douglas 
A. Kahn, ‘‘Rudkin Testamentary Trust — A Response to Prof. 
Cohen,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 21, 2009, p. 1263, Doc 2009-19184, or 
2009 TNT 180-10; Stephen B. Cohen, ‘‘Whom Do You Trust? A 
Reply to Prof. Kahn,’’ Tax Notes, Nov. 9, 2009, p. 711, Doc 2009-
23081, or 2009 TNT 216-7;  Douglas A. Kahn, “It Is Logic Rather 
Than Whom You Trust: A Rejoinder to Prof. Cohen,” Tax Notes, Jan. 
18, 2010, p. 372. 
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Section 67(e)(1) limits a trust’s deduction for costs except costs 
“[that] are paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the 
. . . trust and [that] would not have been incurred if the property were 
not held in . . . trust.”2  Chief Justice Roberts added the word 
“customarily” to the statute.  He read the exception as applying to 
trust administration costs “[that] would not have customarily been 
incurred if the property were not held . . . in trust.”3  On the other 
hand, Associate Justice Sotomayor, at the time a court of appeals 
judge, interpreted the exception to apply to trust administration costs 
that could not have been incurred if the property were not held in 
trust.4  In effect, she read the exception to apply to trust 
administration costs “[that] would not ever have been incurred if the 
                                      
2 The limit consists of treating such costs as miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, deductible under the regular tax only to the extent that 
they exceed 2% of adjusted gross income and not deductible at all for 
purposes of the alternative minimum tax. 
 
3 Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782, 789 (2008), Doc 2008-948, 
2008 TNT 12-6. 
4 William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Com- missioner, 467 F.3d 
149, 156 (2d Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-21522, 2006 TNT 203-4, aff’d sub 
nom. Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008), Doc 2008-948, 
2008 TNT 12-6. 
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property were not held . . . in trust.”  In effect, she added the word 
“ever” rather than the word “customarily” to the statute.   
I contended that either reading is semantically plausible.  I did 
express a personal preference for Associate Justice Sotomayor’s 
reading because it would be easier to administer.  I did not assert 
either that her reading was otherwise superior or that Chief Justice 
Roberts’ reading was untenable. 
Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand, argued that Associate 
Justice Sotomayor’s reading “flies in the face of the statute,”5 and 
Prof. Kahn agreed.  Obviously, either reading imposes some judicial 
gloss on Section 67(e)(1).  How then do Chief Justice Roberts and 
Prof. Kahn justify their shared conclusion that the word “customarily” 
can be read into Section 67(e)(1) but that adding the word “ever” 
“flies in the face of the statute”? 
They argued that Congress’ use of “would” rather than “could” 
in Section 67(e)(1) indicates that Associate Justice Sotomayor’s 
reading is necessarily incorrect.  I suggested other explanations for 
the use or “would” rather than “could”: 
                                      
5 Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 787. 
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It might signify a lack of consciousness about the 
ambiguity inherent in the statute as written.  Or it might 
reflect a legislative decision not to resolve this ambiguity 
and instead to allow courts to determine more specifically 
how to apply the language.  The logical mistake of both 
Roberts and Kahn is assuming that a failure to resolve the 
ambiguity through the use of the word “could” in place of 
“would” necessarily implies a resolution of the ambiguity 
in one way rather than another.  
 
 To repeat, Chief Justice Roberts and Prof Kahn assume that 
the use of “would” necessarily implies that Congress rejected the 
meaning ascribed to Section 67(e)(1) by Associate Justice 
Sotomayor.  I offered two alternative explanations, both plausible.  
Given these plausible alternative explanations, along with the 
absence of any evidence that Congress ever considered the “could” 
alternative, the use of “would” cannot justify rejecting Associate 
Justice Sotomayor’s reading as implausible. 
Prof. Kahn and I also disagreed about the meaning of the word 
“costs” in Section 67(e)(2), a companion provision to Section 
67(e)(1).  The meaning is relevant to whether Associate Justice 
Sotomayor’s reading would make some of Section 67(e)(1)’s 
language superfluous.  I will spare readers an explanation of the 
connection, which is available in our prior articles.  What is relevant 
here is our specific disagreement about the meaning of “costs.”   
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I argued that “costs” in Section 67(e)(2) could be read as that 
word is understood in everyday “common parlance.”  Prof. Kahn 
emphatically insisted that the word “costs” be given a specialized, 
technical meaning and ridiculed the “common parlance” approach.  
Again, as a matter of semantics, either reading is plausible.  
Moreover, Prof. Kahn’s insistence that only a highly technical reading 
of the word “costs” is permissible seems at odds with the position of 
at least one eminent jurist, Judge Henry Friendly, who wrote: 
When Congress uses a non-technical word in a tax 
statute, presumably it wants administrators and courts to 
read it in the way that ordinary people would understand, 
and not “to draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the 
bounds of the normal meaning of words.” Addison v. Holly 
Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617, 64 S.Ct. 1215, 
1221, 88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944).6   
 
In truth, the language of Section 67(e)(1) is a mess. The 
language is not susceptible of easy application because it refers to a 
counterfactual.  The language directs us to assume that the property 
in question, which is in fact held by a trust, is not held by a trust.  We 
are then to determine whether, in those hypothetical, counterfactual 
circumstances, the owner would have incurred the expenses, either 
                                      
6 Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 864, 92 S.Ct. 54, 30 L.Ed.2d 108 (1971) 
 5
customarily or ever, depending on how we choose to interpret the 
statute.  Instead of applying the law to facts that have occurred, we 
are asked to apply the law to counterfactuals and imagine what would 
have occurred had the facts been counter to what they were.  Given 
such problematic language, as well as an absence of clear legislative 
intent, it is unsurprising that there is more than one semantically 
plausible way to read the statute. 
I was moved to write about the differing interpretations of 
Section 67(e)(1) by Justice Roberts’ characterization of Associate 
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning.  It “flies in the face of the statute,” he 
wrote, suggesting a judicial activist, intent on overturning the intent of 
Congress in order to pursue a private social or political agenda.  I 
believe that the Chief Justice should have offered more plausible 
reasons for preferring his reading of Section 67(e)(1) instead of the 
implausible claim that Associate Justice’s Sotomayor’s semantically 
plausible reading “flies in the face of the statute.” 
In her court of appeals decision, then Judge Sotomayor did 
examine these two possible ways of reading Section 67(e)(1) and 
explained her preference for reading the statute as if it contained the 
word “ever” rather than the word “customarily.”   It would make the 
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statute, she argued, easier to administer, a view later endorsed by tax 
experts concerned that Chief Justice Roberts’ contrary position would 
create an administrative mess.7  
After my initial article appeared, I was further chagrined to read 
Prof. Kahn’s response, characterizing my citation of both the 
Treasury’s and the Solicitor General’s approval of Associate Justice 
Sotomayor’s reading of Section 67(e)(1).  He wrote: 
Cohen’s view that approval of a court’s holding by the 
winning party demonstrates the validity of that holding is 
extraordinary to the point of being bizarre (emphasis 
added).  
 
In fact, I did not claim that approval by any winning party 
demonstrates the validity of the holding.  The Treasury and the 
Solicitor General have larger responsibilities for the fair and efficient 
administration of federal law than any purely private litigant.  My point 
- that their approval suggests that Associate Justice Sotomayor’s 
reading was semantically plausible and did not, as Chief Justice 
                                      
7 Lindsay Roshkind, ‘‘Interpreting I.R.C. § 67(e): The Supreme Court’s 
Attempt to Nail Investment Advisory Fees to the Floor,’’ 60 Fla. L. 
Rev. 961, 970-972 (2008); Dean Roy, ‘‘Is That the End? Section 
67(e)(1) and Trust Investment Advisory Fees after Knight v. 
Commissioner,’’ 61 Tax Law. 321, 326 (2007). 
 7
 8
                                     
Roberts claimed, “fly in the face of the statute” - is hardly bizarre or 
extraordinary. 
A principal concern of the Solicitor General, in deciding what 
position to adopt in tax litigation, is practical administration of the tax 
laws.  The office does not want to win with a theory that the IRS 
personnel in the field cannot administer.  In the words of one former 
Deputy Solicitor General:  
In my experience in the office, administrative 
feasibility was as important as revenue-
grabbing.  Associate Justice Sotomayor’s 
interpretation has much to recommend it in 
terms of ease of administration, and this is 
something the Solicitor General properly takes 
into account in deciding what position the 
United States will advance.8 
 
There is, of course, nothing wrong with Chief Justice Roberts 
and Prof. Kahn preferring their interpretation of the statute to 
Associate Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation.  But they find “plain 
meaning” where none exists and too readily accuse others, who 
disagree with their interpretation, of riding roughshod over the statute.   
 
8 Conversation with Albert G. Lauber, February 19, 2010. 
